Destroyers for Bases, 1940: How the US Got British Possessions for 99 Years

The 1940 “destroyers for bases” deal looked like help for an ally. In fact Roosevelt got a strategic belt of bases around the Caribbean for 99 years. He paid with old ships, and Congress never even voted. What I like about this story is the honesty of the numbers: how much was given, how much was taken and who was left with the land.

Let’s look at how it happened and why it is remembered less often today than ordinary “aid”.

Context: summer 1940

In the summer of 1940 France fell, and Britain was left in the war almost alone. The British fleet was losing destroyers, and they were needed to protect convoys. So Churchill asked Roosevelt for fifty old American ships.

The US formally remained neutral. The law complicated the transfer of ships to a belligerent country. Nevertheless, a way out was found.

Destroyers for bases: the terms of the deal

On 2 September 1940 Roosevelt and Churchill concluded the agreement. The US handed Britain 50 destroyers from the First World War era. In return it received the right to bases for 99 years. Newfoundland and Bermuda were given as a gift, while the Bahamas, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Antigua, Trinidad and British Guiana were exchanged for the ships.

Roosevelt framed the deal as an executive agreement, without the approval of Congress. The legal justification was prepared by Attorney General Robert Jackson. Critics, however, said that the president had bypassed constitutional procedure.

What each side got

Britain got ships that needed repair. But they proved useful for protecting convoys. The US got what it had wanted for a long time. The bases covered the approaches to the Panama Canal and the East Coast. And no war was needed for it, and no land had to be bought.

The lease terms gave the US broad rights on those territories. Nobody asked the locals. The bases operated for decades. Argentia in Newfoundland closed in 1994, the American base in Bermuda in 1995. Part of Chaguaramas in Trinidad was returned after protests in the 1960s.

How the deal changed the balance of power

The deal was an early step towards the US entering the war. Moreover, it symbolised a handover of imperial legacy: London got destroyers and paid with land and control. More on how the US consolidated influence in the Caribbean in my articles on the military government in Cuba and on the interventions in the Dominican Republic.

The conclusion for history

The deal showed how a president can change the balance of power without Congress. Old ships cost the US little, and in return it got bridgeheads it used for half a century. It is useful to compare it with the entry into the previous world war, which I wrote about in my article on the First World War.

Old ships and new bases: what was in the small print

As it turned out, the Wickes-class destroyers had been built back in 1918–1919 and needed serious repair. Therefore by the end of 1940 only a few of them were in service. Meanwhile the bases in Newfoundland, the Bahamas and the Caribbean the US received at once and for a long time, not just for the duration of the repairs. Moreover, the agreement was presented as an “exchange”, although Britain gave away the two most valuable bases for nothing.

Thus London in effect paid with a piece of the empire. For example, Trinidad and Jamaica became US bridgeheads before the residents themselves had the right to vote. The details of the deal are in the reference article on the Destroyers for Bases Agreement.

Destroyers for bases: why the deal is considered a model

In American textbooks the “destroyers for bases” deal is presented as a model of clever diplomacy. For example, the president got without Congress what admirals had dreamed of since the last century. Moreover, Roosevelt convinced the public that he was giving away “old junk”, when in fact he was buying the approaches to the continent. Therefore historians still argue about who gained more, London or Washington.

I am closer to a different question: who asked the people of the islands? Thus the deal shows an old imperial habit: the fate of colonies is decided in capitals, not where people live. The US used a similar approach in Cuba, which I wrote about in my article on the Platt Amendment.

Nothing has changed: bases in exchange for aid

The format has become softer: instead of 99-year leases there are “access” agreements. The aim remains the same: presence in a region strengthens the US position.

The Philippines, February 2023. The US and the Philippines announced four new sites under the EDCA agreement. In all, American forces gained access to nine bases.

Papua New Guinea, May 2023. The country signed a defence agreement with the US on access for American forces to its ports and airfields.

Greece, October 2021. The US and Greece extended their defence cooperation agreement. It expanded the American presence, including around Alexandroupolis.

Greenland, 2025–2026. Trump publicly demands to “get” the island, and in January 2026 announced a “framework understanding” with NATO without asking the Greenlanders themselves.

Destroyers for bases is not a museum piece but a template that Washington still uses. A similar approach to Central America is described in the article on the invasion of Honduras.